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Abstract  
In today’s globalized world it is nearly impossible for countries to act independently without 
some degree of cooperation. It is even more diffult for countries with high levels of 
dependence. Dependence in Belarus on others influences its foreign policy in a way that inhibits 
Belarus‘ power. The degree of dependence, power, and interdependence in Belarus is analyzed 
by looking at its level of participation in international organizations, trade partners, and reliance 
on foreign aid. 
Abstrakt 
V dnešním globalizovaném světě je téměř nemožné, aby země jednaly nezávisle bez jisté míry 
spolupráce. To je dokonce ještě obtížnější pro země s vysokou úrovní závislosti. Závislost 
Běloruska na ostatních ovlivňuje jeho zahraniční politiku takovým způsobem, který potlačuje 
sílu Běloruska. Stupeň závislosti, síly a vzájemné závislosti Běloruska je analyzován pohledem na 
jeho úroveň účasti v mezinárodních organizacích, obchodní partnery a spoléhání se na cizí 
pomoc. 
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Today scholars devote attention to the role of interdependence in an increasingly globalized 
world. In order to be a part of the international community and survive as a nation, it is 
increasingly more necessary to cooperate with other nations. The required amount of 
cooperation with other countries depends on the amount of power that the country has and 
what exactly they are hoping to gain (or not lose) by cooperating with others. Belarus has a 
significant amount of dependence on Russia and has been in this predicament predominantly 
since Lukashenko became president of Belarus and reestablished strong ties with Russia.  
This research aims to answer the following questions: How do the relationships that Belarus has 
with international organizations influence its dependence, and how does Belarus’ dependence 
influence these relationships? On who and on what is Belarus dependent? Who benefits from 
this dependence? Is there incentive to lose this dependence? And is it even possible?  
There has been research done on the foreign policies in Belarus and how Lukashenko strategizes 
his policies in a way to legitimize his power.  Further research is done on how Lukashenko is 
dependent on Russia and how President Lukashenko attempts to lessen his dependence on 
Russia by looking to the West or to others.  My research also examines Belarus’ relationship with 
Russia and the high level of dependence Belarus has on Russia, but more specifically elaborates 
the situation that Belarus cannot exit its dependence on Russia without increasing its 
dependence on other actors who have more power than Belarus.  
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This research focuses on the quantity and quality of dependence in Belarus based on the quality 
of international partnerships and trade partners. This is not economic research although includes 
topics related to the Belarusian economy such as GDP and trade turnover with various partners 
in order to highlight the level of interdependence between Belarus and its partners. This research 
is not economic research but deals with economic markers that indicate the level of interaction 
that Belarus has with various trading partners. I also look at the type of goods that Belarus 
imports and exports and how crucial these goods are in shaping the relationship Belarus has with 
its trading partners. This research examines the various organizations that Belarus is involved in 
and how actively involved and cooperative Belarus is with or within these organizations.  
Lukashenko is trapped in a cycle of dependence and would only be able to transfer current 
dependence onto another actor who would exert more power on Belarus. Understanding how 
Belarus exists between the European Union and Russia provides insight into understanding how 
the two hegemons of the European Union and Russia interact with each other. Belarus’ location 
and role as a transit route makes it nearly impossible for Belarus to act independently without 
outside powers attempting to influence how the country acts, as they see both see the benefits 
of having Belarus allied with them. Lukashenko has used this position to its advantage in order 
to extract financial assistance from various directions.  
My hypothesis is that Belarus’ dependence on Russia impedes Belarus’ relationships with other 
international institutions and decreases Belarus’ power in choosing who to cooperate with. 
Additionally, Lukashenko’s policies increase conflict and decrease cooperation within the 
international community, further decreasing interdependence.  What is interdependence and its 
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importance for international relations and the foreign policy of countries is discussed in the 
literature review. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Dependence and Interdependence  
2.1.1 Realism and Liberalism 
To understand and define the theory of interdependence, which is the main theoretical concept 
used in this research, it is necessary to understand the two main approaches to dealing with this 
concept, i.e. the realist approach and the liberal approach.  
Realism in international relations is arguably the more pessimistic way to approach looking at the 
world compared to liberalism. Realists view cooperation as having some negative consequences 
and not always the goal of countries, whereas liberals think most countries strive for cooperation 
and there are little negative consequences. Realists believe that self-interest dominates in 
international affairs and that power plays a significant role. They also assert that countries 
behave rationally or irrationally and this interplay impacts the country’s role in the international 
area. Behaving rationally in the realist sense means behaving in a way that would maximize 
profits and minimize military threats.  Liberals think that countries do not always act out of 
merely self-interest or seeking profits. Realists rely on the idea of human nature and that humans 
are not animals who abide by the laws of nature, but we are also not perfect and celestial. 
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Humans ought to follow human nature and follow instincts, which realists view as rational. 
Realists acknowledge fear as a driving motivation for human action.1  
2.1.2 Definitions of Interdependence 
Interdependence descends from the concept of dependence. Dependence is the opposite of 
power. The concept of power has dominated scholarly research in international relations. 
Realists define power as the ability to get others to do what they otherwise might not want to do 
because the one with the power has materials that the other wants.2 The one who does not have 
the ability to do this is dependent. Most countries have something to offer their partner so there 
is rarely a case of pure dependence and instead countries offer each other something and it 
becomes a situation of interdependence, not just power and dependence. Within 
interdependent relationships, sometimes one country has more power than the other and the 
other country is more dependent. The more dependent country still has some power within an 
interdependent relationship. If it did not, then the country would surely end the relationship, 
especially if countries behave in a way that motivates their self-interest, as realists believe.  
Dependence affects the relationship of the actors in the relationship in a variety of ways. James 
A. Schellenberg in 1965 claimed that the value dependence could be measured by taking the ratio 
of rewards and costs over the desire to find and availability of alternatives. Schellenberg discusses 
the three concepts of collaboration, exploitation, and disengagement and their relation to 
                                                          
1 Forde, Steven. "International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and 
Neorealism." International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 144-148 




dependence. Collaboration is two actors working together, exploitation is one actor taking 
advantage of the other actor, and disengagement is when both parties decide to end their 
relationship. The likelihood for collaboration increases as the level of dependence increases. The 
tendency towards exploitation is directly related to the level of dependence of the other partner 
and indirectly related to the dependence of the actor. The tendency towards disengagement is 
indirectly related to the level of dependence. Schellenberg goes on to state that collaboration 
from one, increases as collaboration from the other also increases and that the tendency towards 
disengagement increases as the level of exportation increases from the other partner.3  
Interdependence is complex and does not have one clear definition. For some theorists such as 
Rosecrance et al interdependence is a something that can be measured and analyzed as data and 
they use this data to explain changes in interdependence.  One way in which interdependence is 
measured is by measuring the flow of goods between states. Interdependence is not stable over 
time as relationships between countries changes overtime and sometimes something that is 
positive for one country no longer is positive for the other. Both economic and political factors 
influence interdependence, not only economic factors- although they exhibit a great degree of 
control over the interconnectedness of different partners, although in light of economic 
downturn, political influence in interdependence increases.4 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye wrote extensively about interdependence in their ground-
breaking work Power and Interdependence. Written in 1989, they apply their theory primarily on 
                                                          
3 Schellenberg, James A. "Dependence and Cooperation." Sociometry 28, no. 2 (1965): 158-160 
4 Rosecrance, R., Alexandroff A., Koehler W., Kroll J., Laqueur S., and Stocker J. "Whither 
Interdependence?" International Organization 31, no. 3 (1977): 425, 441, 442-443 
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the United States and it’s the USA’s relationship with other countries. Keohane and Nye begin by 
defining dependence because in order to understand interdependence it is necessary to 
understand dependence. According to Keohane and Nye dependence means “a state of being 
determined or significantly affected by external forces”. They then define interdependence as 
“mutual dependence”. This means that countries are connected with each other and vulnerable 
to any changes outside the country. Most countries have something to offer another country and 
coexist in a globalized community that cannot become less connected. Dependence also is 
contingent upon what the country depends on from another foreign actor. Some goods are more 
important for national security than others. For instance, oil is more crucial to security than luxury 
goods. Interdependence should not be seen as solely positive and a combatant against 
dependence. Keohane and Nye explicitly state that “interdependence will always involve costs 
because interdependence restricts autonomy”. Interdependency may restrict autonomy, but 
dependence would outright prevent autonomy so interdependency is a still a preferable option 
for autonomy than dependence and a favorable position for the less powerful country to be in. 
Under the theory of interdependence, domestic policy and foreign policy have a mutually 
beneficial relationship. Interdependence not only contributes to increased relations with foreign 
actors, but in turn leads to a more stable environment domestically. Keohane and Nye stress that 
interdependence does not ultimately decrease any problems within the international realm. 
Interdependence is not a zero-sum game. Power can increase simultaneously in each country, if 
the status-quo remains the same. Interdependence means mutual dependence; yet, 
interdependence does not lead to or even mean that each actor will mutually benefit each other 
equally. In the majority of cases, one country is rarely or never fully dependent on another 
7 
 
country. There is a spectrum of dependence and interdependence, with essentially everyone 
having some degree of interdependence. Each country offers at least something to the other. 
Usually there is an unequal level of interdependence where one country is more dependent on 
the other and vice versa. Interdependence is not an alternative to dependence but instead a 
variation of dependence. Interdependence is not a way for a dependent to break out of 
dependence entirely but acts as a way for both partners to depend on each other in some way. 
The degree of dependence depends on the partner within the relationship. Within the context of 
globalization, most countries are offering at least something to their partners and alliances, 
either through trade or through ideological partnerships.5  
Political Scientist David A. Baldwin in 1981 attempted to define interdependence, not by creating 
a new definition, but instead by clarifying already existing definitions in order to hopefully make 
it possible to measure interdependence as a concise concept. Without a clear definition, 
measuring the concept could be possible, but would make the outcomes of these measurements 
difficult to compare or analyze. Within the arena of international relations, early theorists define 
interdependence either as reliance on others or as mutual benefits, with benefits also meaning 
avoiding the next worst alternative, even if there are not any added benefits. A relationship is 
only interdependent if it is better to keep the relationship than to end it, regardless of how bad 
the relationship is. If ending the relationship would have no consequences or if things would in 
fact get better, then the relationship was not interdependent. If there is force within the 
relationship, then the level of interdependence decreases. Some of the key aspects of an 
                                                          
5 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (USA: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-
Publication Data, 1989), 8-10 
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interdependent relationship are mutual benefit, high cost of ending the relationship, respect of 
the partners, and a tolerance of the ill-fate of the world/situation. In sum, Baldwin defines the 
main aspect of interdependence as having low opportunity costs. He concludes with the bold 
statement that it is crucial to understand the costs and benefits of interdependence and have a 
clear definition otherwise “mankind’s survival is endangered”.6 
2.1.3 Interdependence and Conflict 
Scholars devote a significant amount of attention to the interrelationship between 
interdependence and conflict. Conflict deterrence (or promotion) is one of the main aspects 
within the theoretic study of interdependence. Within the study of interdependence there are 
two main theoretical camps, realist and liberal. Liberal theorists view interdependence as a 
means for decreasing conflict, while realists are more critical of interdependence. Realists think 
that interdependence can increase or decrease conflict, depending on the situation, and that 
cooperation between countries is not always the most rational choice. 
Zeev Maoz outlines the shortcomings of the current state of art on interdependence in four 
categories, but these can essentially be summarized into only two- emphasis on economic 
interdependence and emphasis on “dyadic relationships”. One shortcoming is the emphasis on 
trade and economic relationships between states and not enough attention is given to the other 
areas in which states can be interconnected and that these other avenues can often off-set the 
economic ties between two countries. Another shortcoming in the current state of art according 
                                                          
6 Baldwin, David A. "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis." International Organization 34, no. 4 
(1980): 471-472, 482-484. 505-506 
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to Maoz is that attention is primarily given to states with direct ties to each other, without focus 
on the fact that some states can have interdependence without being in direct contact. Maoz’s 
primary goal in his literature is to analyze the effect of interdependence on conflict, while noting 
that conflict can also affect interdependence. Realists conclude that interdependence can raise 
conflict between states by giving one state less autonomy and perhaps being at the will of the 
more powerful state, but on the other hand other realists conclude that interdependence 
decreases conflicts in “dyadic relationships”. Liberal theorists view interdependence as good 
both economically and strategically, with the primary goal of interdependence to decrease 
uncertainty. If there is more strategic interdependence, there is less need for conflict. Maoz 
outlines that liberal theorists think that interdependence decreases conflict on every level, 
although it might increase conflict to a third party, but realists disagree with this notion and state 
that interdependence does not always hinder or prevent conflict.7  
Scholar Susan M. McMillan also writes about conflict and interdependence in her research 
Interdependence and Conflict. She gives attention to the overlap between economic 
interdependence and political interdependence which she describes as not having significant 
attention within the research on interdependence. McMillan describes that most attention is 
given to economic interdependence and that liberal theorists believe that interdependence 
decreases conflict and are all in consensus with this. However, she notes that people measure 
different aspects of economic interdependence (trade proportion of GDP, trade volumes, trade 
values, etc.) but do not distinguish which of these economic factors has the biggest role in 
                                                          
7 Maoz, Zeev. "The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict across Levels of 
Analysis." American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 1 (2009): 223-225 
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decreasing conflict. McMillan criticizes the liberal theorists stating also that, in addition to the 
differing economic variables being measured, the impact of interdependence on conflict depends 
on the type of good being traded. Like Zeev, McMillan argues that other types of 
interdependence influence conflict deterrence or promotion, such as military or diplomatic 
interdependence, and do not have the same impact as economic interdependence. All the 
variations of interdependence might all interact to at least extent and in order to understand the 
role of interdependence on conflict the best method to understand this is to look at these 
interactions. This raises the question of which facets or interactions within of interdependence 
cause conflict, which resolve it.8 
2.1.4 Dependency 
Dependency is a related concept to dependence and interdependence, although not entirely the 
same. Thomas Angotti, a dependency theorist, describes dependence within the context of Latin 
America. Due to economic differences, Latin American countries have had to rely on other 
countries with different economic systems more suitable to the current economic and 
international environment at present. Angotti defines dependency as a phenomenon where a 
dependent is contingent upon on a dominant country. The dominant country sees the dependent 
country as underdeveloped and itself as developed. The dominant country furthers this idea of 
underdevelopment by propagating an image of backwardness in the dependent country in order 
to suit their own needs, i.e. exploitation of labor and capital. The dominant country views this 
                                                          
8 McMillan, Susan M. "Interdependence and Conflict." Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997): 33, 
34, 53, 54. 
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exploitation as necessary and “requires repression of independent nations in order to guarantee 
the export of capital.” Angotti believes that independence from foreign dominion is the cure for 
underdevelopments and that underdevelopment is caused by external forces (the dominant 
country). Dependency theory accentuates the rejection of backwardness, analyses the belief that 
developed counties make up the “core” and are surrounded by a less-advanced dependent 
periphery, and that capital and labor in the dependent countries does not equal to the value 
produced for the dominant country.9 Scholar Tony Smith does not deny the importance of foreign 
influence in weaker states; however, he views the economic effect on the development in these 
relatively weaker states from the stronger ones as exaggerated. He essentially dismisses 
dependency theory as an “attempt at Marxism” and things that local circumstances factor more 
into the development of the “dependent” countries than imperialist or capitalism forces from 
the dominant countries. Dependency is prevalent in Latin American countries that have to deal 
with the hegemon of the United States as their big neighbor to the north.10  
Belarus and other post-Soviet states must deal with dependency in their own way with Russia 
acting as their hegemon in the region. Despite a relatively higher degree of dependence of post-
Soviet states on Russia, Belarus included, interdependency used as a means to break away from 
dependence does not exist in the post-Soviet space as much as it would seem. The countries in 
this space today seek their own personal goals in foreign relations. Trade unions and the Single 
Economic Space made it possible to lower tariffs and encourage trade within the region; 
                                                          
9 Thomas Angotti, “The Political Implications of Dependency Theory,” Latin American Perspectives 8, no. 3 (1981): 
125-135 
10 Tony Smith, “The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited,” International Organization 35, no. 4 (1981): 761 
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however, fear of Russian hegemony created a situation where other countries seek economic 
interdependence through other means other than working solely with Russia.11  
2.2 Transition Economies 
Transition began in the early 1990s and is important for understanding President Lukashenko’s 
regime in Belarus and its impact on the country’ s relations with the international community. 
The transition in Belarus, or lack thereof, shaped the politics and economy within the state and 
thus contributed to its relationship with the West. Classifying Belarus as a transition country is 
interesting because since Lukashenko has been in power, he stopped the transition. Yet, working 
with western institutions and the IMF in particular, Lukashenko does make promises to make 
market reforms.  
Transition in this instance deals with former East Bloc countries moving from their formerly 
centrally planned economy to a market based economy. The economy of these countries 
experienced growth at first, but this style of economy was not suitable for innovation or an 
“efficient allocation of resources”. From the 1960s until the end of the 1980s, the centrally 
planned economy of the former East Bloc as a whole declined, while market economies in 
western Europe grew. After the Soviet Union dissolved, most of the emergent countries went 
through a period of transition in the forms of either shock or gradual. However, some countries 
did not transition, with Belarus being one of those countries. Some countries, particularly those 
in Central Europe had incentives for transition, particularly the prospect of joining the EU. Within 
                                                          
11 Alexander Libman, “Regionalization and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: Current Status and Implications 
for Institutional Development,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 3 (2007): 401 
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the East Bloc, CIS countries performed the worst in transition. Belarus, by avoiding transition, 
avoided the formation of political coups, drastic increase in organized crime, rent-seeking, and 
corruption.12 In order to move from a centrally planned economy to a market economy includes 
various aspects such as price liberalization and independent central banking.13  
In the early 1990s, Belarus had a competitive regime until later it became more closed. Belarusian 
politics had everything stacked against it with having no history of democracy and some degree 
of international isolation. Belarus did enter a period of transition before deciding to reverse the 
transition that had already taken place and put a halt to any further attempts at transition, in 
favor of a primarily state-ran economy and a political system that outside observers have 
described as a dictatorship. There are a variety of reasons why Belarus decided to halt the 
transition and why it became more closed after these brief period of transition in the early 1990s. 
Closure means manipulation of elections to get desired results, weak opposition, and a weak 
parliament relative to presidential power. Lucan A. Way attributes the re-closure of the regime 
to the fact that the EU was not pushing for Belarus to join, Belarus did not have any pressing to 
keep up these reforms. Ties with the West have increased over the years, yet political 
competitiveness has decreased. Way also asserts that the weak opposition in the government 
ensured that President Lukashenko could preserve the power the state had over the economy 
and that skill in preserving the authoritarian regime in Belarus was understated by those 
promoting democratic transitions, in which President Lukashenko “had to learn how to use 
                                                          
12 Svejnar, Jan. "Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 
1 (2002): 3-4, 7, 10 
13 Guriev, Sergei, and Zhuravskaya Ekaterina. "(Un)Happiness in Transition." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 23, no. 2 (2009): 143 
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existing resources to compete in semi-competitive environments, to keep allies in line, and to 
coerce op position without provoking international reaction”. Additionally, it was not until later 
that Belarus has a better financial situation enabling for the authoritarian regime to solidify, 
unlike in the early 1990s when the economic situation of the FSU was essentially in shambles. 
Lukashenko avoided any privatization unlike other similar countries and avoided having a slew of 
oligarchs in the country undermining the regime. However, Belarus’ reliance on Russia creates 
some weakness in Lukashenko’s regime.14 
The benefits of transition include an increase in GDP per capita and an increase in consumption.  
Economists Sergei Guriev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya note that although there was an increase in 
income and consumption in transition countries, the majority of transition countries are not 
happy with the transition and report lower levels of life satisfaction than in the early 1990s. 
Belarus is one of the transition countries in which life satisfaction has increased, despite the low 
or non-existent transition in the country. This is notable when comparing the life satisfaction in 
Belarus compared to in countries who took measures to transition. The relatively higher levels of 
life satisfaction in Belarus leave little motivation for any drastic reform in the economy. The main 
criticisms of the transition by other transition countries are due to a decrease in the public goods, 
demand of different skills in the workforce, greater socioeconomic disparities, and higher 
expectations after beginning to see themselves on the same level as more advanced market 
economies.15  
                                                          
14 Way, Lucan A. "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The 
Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine." World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 231, 233, 237, 243, 245, 249, 255 
15 Guriev, Sergei, and Zhuravskaya Ekaterina. "(Un)Happiness in Transition." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 23, no. 2 (2009): 143, 153, 157 
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Jan Svejnar defines the end of transition as when countries adopt a market economy that leads 
to rapid growth which allows the county to interact with advanced market economies 
(particularly in western Europe) without some form of protection. Based on his own definition 
and the surveys conducted by transition countries, as of the year 2002 most of these countries 
surveyed felt that they had not completed transition. Another reason that the transition 
countries of the FSU and former East Bloc do not feel they have finished their transition is because 
they want to be equal to more advanced countries (again, primarily western Europe). Svejnar 
believes that the transition in general has been unsatisfying and disappointing. 16 
Economist Janos Kornai defines the end of transition as when the communist party loses majority 
of power, the private sector accounts for the majority of GDP, and the market controls the 
economy.17 By this definition, Belarus has not completed transition. Later I will discuss the various 
steps and promises that Belarus has made to certain organizations that would suggest that 
Belarus has intentions of adopting market reforms; however, based on the fact that Belarus fails 
to follow through on these commitments shows that Belarus is still not ready to transition. In the 
following section I discuss the Belarusian economy and its relationship to the transition path the 
country took. 
                                                          
16 Svejnar, Jan. "Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 
1 (2002): 23, 26 
17 Kornai, Janos. 1999. "Reforming the Welfare State in Postsocialist Economies," in When is Transition Over? 
Annette Brown, ed. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, chapter 6. 
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2.2.1 Economy of Belarus 
Belarus’ transition was “distorted” due to wanting to preserve many elements of the BSSR by 
keeping intact many communist institutions. This happened during a time when the West 
understood all communist countries as being essentially the same (which was not true) and in 
need of either returning to Europe or at the very least returning to “normal”. The ideology of the 
regime in Belarus, instead of attempting to return to the West and all the ideologies that go along 
with it, i.e. market economy and democracy, isolated itself from the West. The ideology stressed 
that Belarus was not an individualistic country and stressed that the West was the enemy. The 
dependence of Belarus on Russia politically, socially, and economically only made the isolation 
greater. Because of this ideology, there is little entrepreneurial activity in Belarus. Practical 
measures such as high-degree of overregulation and intervention in private businesses have 
made the business climate unappealing to enter. Private businesses are subject to immense 
regulation and must operate under strict conditions. One reason for these strict conditions is that 
business is seen as a threat to stability of the social order. The ideology of Belarus sees Western 
values, primarily individualism, as evil. Keeping businessmen under control keeps order and 
stability in the regime, since the regime emphasizes equality and collectiveness.18  
Belarus experienced economic growth from 1995 to 1997 until facing an economic crisis in 1998. 
Before the crisis Belarus experienced price and exchange rate stability. The economic growth 
experienced in the mid-1990s came as a surprise to economists because they expected that the 
polices in place could not support economic growth or support stable standards of living. This 
                                                          
18 Miazhevich, Galina. "Official Media Discourse and the Self-Representation of Entrepreneurs in Belarus."Europe-
Asia Studies 59, no. 8 (2007): 1331-1332, 1335, 1338 
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would be due to the circumstance that without a market economy, there would be bad indicators 
of supply and demand, and economists expected vast increase in inflation and depreciation of 
the exchange rate of the Belarusian ruble. One theory for why Belarus defied these expectations 
is that Belarus received special treatment from Russia in the form of financial support through 
subsides and certain trade agreements. Despite all the support and assistance from Russia, 
Belarus still fell behind in its payments to Russia. After 1998, Belarus was no longer able to 
contain or compensate for the negative effects of its policies. The so-called “extreme 
dependence” on Russia led Belarus to increases in inflation, shortages, and poverty and a 
decrease in living standards. These effects can be attributed to a change in the relationship 
between Russia and Belarus. Belarus then turned to the IMF, hoping to receive assistance from 
them, but to no avail due to refusing to make the necessary policy changes laid out by the IMF. 
Russia also raised its expectations towards Belarus in order for Belarus to receive assistance from 
Russia. In 1998, the prediction was that Belarus could not sustain its economy and depends far 
too much on Russia, making Belarus vulnerable whenever Russia itself has an economic crisis.19  
Belarusians fears privatization in Belarus when looking at the crony capitalism that occurred in 
Russia. Belarusians did not need to fear this type of privatization so strongly because the main 
sources of the crony capitalism in Russia were in the gas, oil, and metal industries, whereas the 
                                                          
19 Brukoff, Patricia. The Belarusian Economy: Is It Sustainable?. na, 2002. Balmaceda, Margarita Mercedes, James I. 
Clem, and Lisbeth L. Tarlow, eds.Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and 
Implications for the West. Harvard University Press, 2002.109-110, 113, 115-120  
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only big commodity in Belarus was potassium used for fertilizers. Nonetheless, Lukashenko 
gained massive support by means of his strong anti-corruption stance.20  
3 Interdependence and Belarus  
3.1 Lukashenko’s Regime 
Belarusians elected Alexander Lukashenko as their President in 1994. Lukashenko was vastly 
popular as an anti-elitist and with his strong stance against corruption. Lukashenko enjoys 
massive support from farmers and laborers working for the collective agriculture and state-run 
enterprises. There is a level of dependence from the Belarusian people on the state for a variety 
of reasons. Belarus received 70% of the fallout of the Chernobyl disaster. This has left many 
Belarusians in a predicament of depending on the state for aid due to all the health effects and 
the effect on the ability of people to work, since many farms and factories were shut down after 
being contaminated. Almost 30 years have passed since the Chernobyl disaster but this left an 
effect on the Belarusian people and their attitude towards the state. Additionally, Belarusian 
pensioners receive some of the highest benefits from the state in the world and do not want to 
give up this support from the government. The effect of this is that it would not be that simple 
for Belarusians to give up the benefits of Lukashenko’s regime and these benefits contribute to 
keeping him in power. It must be noted as well that elections in Belarus are not considered free 
or fair.  
                                                          




In 1996, Lukashenko held a referendum which solidified his power as president and weakened 
the parliament.   This enabled Lukashenko to be president indefinitely, and laid the framework 
for his relations with the international community in the following years and has shaped his 
relationships with Western countries over the past 20 years. Lukashenko finds himself caught 
between the West and Russia, receiving massive criticism from Western intuitions, while dealing 
with a high degree of dependence on Russia, something that keeps and has kept Belarusian in 
the Russian orbit ever since Lukashenko became president. Lukashenko’s regime is markedly 
different than both the regime of the West (i.e. the European Union) and with Russia’s regime. 
These differences lie mainly in the different path in transition that Belarus decided to take after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Grigory Ioffe and David R. Marples are two of the most prominent writers on Belarus and 
Belarusian foreign policy. Grigory Ioffe has written dozens of articles related to Belarus. One of 
his most prominent works is a three-part article written in 2004 entitled Understanding Belarus, 
devoted to politics and economy, national identity, and language. Later in 2007 Ioffe wrote 
extensively on Belarusian foreign policy in a book entitled Understanding Belarus and How 
Western Foreign Policy Misses the Mark. Ioffe devoted this work to try to give readers a better 
understanding of Belarus and demonstrate that the picture is not as clear as it might seem. He 
believes that Belarus has been drastically misunderstood by the West and in turn this is why the 
political scene does not have the opportunity to change. Belarusian politics according to Ioffe are 
bi-polar with one side being pro-Western and the other side feeling strongly devoted to Russia. 
Lukashenko shapes his foreign policy based on the dependence of Belarus on Russia. Ioffe 
describes that this dependence on Russia and its interplay with Belarus’ foreign policy with Russia 
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stems from a history of dependence even within the domestic sphere, claiming that the 
Chernobyl disaster and the long Soviet past created a culture of dependency among Belarusian 
people and this permeated into the state-policies as well. The dependency culture exists in 
Belarus according to Ioffe for a variety of reasons including the dependency of Belarusians on 
state aid after the Chernobyl disaster, the history of peasant communalism, and Soviet 
communism. Ioffe attributes the development of the dependency culture in Belarus over the past 
two decades primarily due to the Chernobyl disaster, as so many Belarusians were affected by 
the disaster and adopted a victim mentality as well as fear. Grigory Ioffe’s main conclusions 
regarding Belarusian foreign policy are that Belarus must deal with the dependence it has with 
Russia and would like to do so by somehow decreasing that dependence by working with the 
West; however, the West does not understand Belarus or Lukashenko and this makes it 
impossible for Belarus to break out of the Russia orbit.21  
Marples states that Lukashenko did not consolidate a dictatorship with the 1995 amendments 
and additionally that the opposition in the country was never eliminated. And in spite of 
Lukashenko’s emphasis on the historical and psychological ties that Belarus has with Russia, in 
recent years Belarus has received some degree of isolation from Russia, as well as from Ukraine. 
Marples sees Belarus has having the potential to exist between NATO and CIS, between Europe 
and not-Europe. Lukashenko does not represent the wants of the Belarusian people but instead 
uses the “politics of fear” in order to maintain support and keep his regime intact. This is in 
contrast to the “politics of suffering” that Ukraine used, for example, in order to protect their 
                                                          




nationhood. Ioffe stated that Belarus was not really a nation at all and the national myths were 
not embraced. Belarusians did not embrace the politics of suffering so this did not alienate 
Belarus from Russia or “divorce it from the Soviet state”. Marples disagrees with this and instead 
thinks that nationalism did not fail in Belarus. However, the fear-politics used by Lukashenko 
keeps his regime going, with Lukashenko’s goals being to prevent any “colored-revolutions” in 
Belarus and to keep the Belarus economy as strong as possible and prevent a chaotic downturn 
in the living standards of the people.  Yet, Marples acknowledges that Belarus currently has no 
real prospect of joining European structures, at least not anytime in the near future, despite many 
Belarusians he claims having the hope of one-day rejoining Europe. Lukashenko keeps Belarus in 
the Russian orbit and keeps close ties with Belarus’ Soviet past. 22 
David R. Marples and Grigory Ioffe both researched Belarus extensively and represent two 
variations in interpreting Belarus. Ioffe presents Belarus as being misunderstood by the West and 
unduly represented poorly by the international community. His goals in writing about Belarus are 
to describe Belarus in a way that creates a better understanding of the country and reveals that 
picture pained of Belarus by the West and sometimes Russia does not always accurately depict 
the situation in Belarus. Marples, on the other hand, does not hold such an optimistic view of 
Belarus and thinks that things sometimes or often are just as bad as they seem in Belarus. It 
should be noted that Ioffe does not think that everything is positive and going well in Belarus and 
Marples does not view everything as being solely negative. Ioffe just believes that there is more 
to the story and that things are not as abysmal in Belarus as the international media often 
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portrays.  Marples and Ioffe both cite each other in their research claiming the other is 
overstating or flat-out wrong. 2324 
In 1995 Gennady Nesvetailov wrote about the prospects of Belarus in the science and technology 
sector. He analyzed this through the lens of center-periphery relationships within CIS, with 
Belarus being a periphery country and Russia or the EU being the center. His research relates to 
this topic because it helps to define the periphery role of Belarus in relation to Russia in particular 
and outlines the role Belarus experienced in the 1990s, some of which holds true for today. 
According to the center-periphery theory, the periphery is weak and the center is strong; 
however, there is always a level of interdependence between the two with political and economic 
dependence, although they are not tightly linked. In this type of relationship, the economic 
dependence is often dominant and political independence changes the situation very little in the 
periphery state. Belarus fits into the category of a periphery state because it is a small territory 
with restricted human and material resources and has a low internal market capacity. During the 
period of transition in the early 1990s, Belarusian leaders made little to no decisions regarding 
the transition and this resulted in essentially no transition in Belarus. This left Belarus with an 
unfavorable investment climate and behind in all forms of foreign financial credit or investments 
than most other transition countries at the time. Nesvetailov stated that the situation in Belarus 
depends on how it decides to orientate itself with the outside world, i.e. it could orientate itself 
with Russia/CIS, with the European Union, or orientate itself as neutral. In the 1994 constitution, 
the official policy of Belarus became neutrality. Despite this de jure neutrality, Belarus still 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 896-897, 901, 903-906 
24 Ioffe, Grigory. "Understanding Belarus: Economy and Political Landscape." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 1 
(2004): 89, 112-113 
23 
 
remained de facto dependent on Russia. This is in light of the fact that Russian provides a 
common market base for all FSU countries. Belarus specifically needs Russia as a source or 
resources and for sales. What Russia gains is, according to Nesvetailov, a “window to Europe” 
and Belarus supplies high technological products to Russia. Nesvetailov concludes with 
recommendations for science and technology production in Belarus but provides an explanation 
of the center-periphery relationship of Belarus and Russia and the interdependence between the 
two countries.25 
According to Stewart Parker the two guiding principles dominating Belarusian foreign policy are 
close ties of Belarus with Russia and Belarus versus the United States. He states that the 
differences between Belarus and the United States have more to do with economic differences 
than with concerns over human rights. The close ties with Russia are related to the level of 
dependency that Belarus has with Russia since Russia is a huge trading partner with Belarus. 
However, Parker notes that Belarus is not entirely dependence on Russia and has been finding 
new trading partners.  Additionally, Lukashenko promotes Belarus interests abroad in reduce 
Belarusian reliance on Russia without distancing Belarus from Russia. Parker explains how 
Lukashenko is able to maintain its independence: “Lukashenko has been able to successfully 
pursue an independent policy both at home and abroad, despite massive international meddling, 
interference and even direct attempts to subvert the electoral process”. Lukashenko refuses to 
sign documents out of fear of losing Belarusian sovereignty.26 
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Scholars published the book The Multi-Lateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy in 2007.  
Although this book deals primarily with Russian foreign policy, it gives special attention to Belarus 
and its role within CIS. They state that Belarus is very active within CIS and trade turnover, despite 
increasing with other regions such as the European Union and Asia, the turnover has not really 
increased and is still primarily with CIS and with Russia in particular. In spite of this strong trade 
relationship with Russia and the common economic space each country pursued in the 1990s, 
this Union State has not been successful since Russia based the Union State on economic 
principles and Belarus based the union on political principles. In accordance with what 
Nesvetailov stated earlier that economic principles are more dominant than political and 
Lukashenko was not interested in solidifying that type of dependence with Russia. Since 2007, 
Russia has focused more on its own self-interests instead of working in a way to sway Belarus 
from aligning with the west.27  
Nalalia Leshchenko in 2008 wrote about the national ideology base of Lukashenko’s regime. She 
states that the national ideology in Belarus is founded mainly on the idea of collectivism and 
putting the state above all else. This influences the foreign policy of Belarus since Belarusians 
start to disregard foreign organizations and countries as being responsible for social and 
economic problems within the country. Lukashenko’s foreign policies are not able to function in 
an effective way due to the collectivism praised by the national ideology. Leshchenko like Ioffe 
discusses the “climate of fear” in Belarus, brought about not by the Chernobyl disaster as Ioffe 
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describes, but due to the political prisoners in Belarus and the security forces present in the 
country.28 
Andrew Wilson discusses extensively Lukashenko’s regime and how he rose to power and 
solidified his regime. In relating to the West, Lukashenko only received such strong isolation since 
1997 when he extended his first term as president and had a referendum that gave the president 
more power and weakened the parliament. Lukashenko began his second term in 2001 and that 
is when his authoritarian regime solidified and opponents realized they were too weak to take 
on Lukashenko. 2001 is also the year that Russia started to put economic pressure on Belarus and 
to economize the Union State, partially due to Putin being less interested in the progression of 
the Union State than Yeltsin had been in the 1990s. The 2000s marked a period of gas wars 
between Russia and Belarus, where Russia wanted to raise the extraordinarily low prices that 
Belarus was paying for energy. Paying more was not something that Lukashenko wanted to do 
and avoided doing so as long as possible until the prices were eventually raised, although not 
very much and Belarus still did not have to pay anywhere near market prices for its energy supply 
from Russia. Wilson believes that Putin underestimated Lukashenko’s power and that Belarus 
has a certain amount of power in the fact that it transports gas and oil for Russia to Europe. In 
light of these issues with gas and oil, in 2006 Lukashenko began to diversify in his partners in 
order to not rely solely on Russia. Wilson states that Lukashenko tries to play the game of getting 
as much as possible financially from both the Russia and the West. Belarus remains dependent 
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on Russia for energy sources but Russia is also dependent on Belarus as a transit country for its 
energy supply to Europe.29 
3.2 Memberships and Cooperation 
Belarus is a member of a variety of international organizations with the majority of them being 
with other Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, predominantly with Russia, but also some 
memberships that exclude Russia. Belarus is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Union State with Russia, and the Collective 
Security Organization (CSTO). Belarus is also a member of the Customs Union (CU), which was 
established in 2010, with the other member states of Russia and Kazakhstan. The goal of these 
institutions is essentially to increase the standard of living within the member-states by means 
of “free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor”.30 The most successful of these 
organizations for Belarus has been the CIS and the Union State, based on the free trade 
agreements and the high level of trade between Belarus and these member-states. The Union 
State has benefited the Belarusian economy in a variety of ways, especially regarding the transit 
of gas and oil.  
The primary goal of these organizations is economic and to encourage trade within the FSU space. 
The secondary goal by means of the economic goal is to encourage a political alliance in order to 
obtain leverage against other world powers, which may be at odds with the political goals of 
many countries of the FSU. Politics in Belarus goes between two extremes, pro-West or pro-
                                                          
29 Wilson, Andrew. Belarus: the last European dictatorship. Yale University Press, 2011. 194-195, 201, 209, 258.  
30 Eurasian Economic Union. (2016). http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about. (Date accessed: Aug 11, 2016).   
27 
 
Russia.  The majority of support in Belarus goes to Russia. There is not as much support for the 
West as the West only funds NGOs and the opposition of Lukashenko. Many of those who take a 
pro-Russian stance in fact value Belarusian sovereignty over cooperation with Russia but they 
reality that they can only count on Russia for support. Ioffe goes as far to say that the destiny of 
Belarus to be with Russia is “more assured than ever”.31 
3.2.1 Commonwealth of Independent States 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991 in the midst of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The founding members of the CIS were Belarus, Russia, and 
Ukraine, and signed the agreement establishing the organization in Viskuli, Belarus. Today the 
CIS includes member-states from 12 of the former Soviet republics with the headquarters for the 
CIS being located in Minsk, Belarus. The CIS emerged as an entity meant to resemble the Soviet 
Union and in some way attempts to mimic to the EU, being a collective with member-states 
working together for common economic and security goals. The initial goal in creating the CIS 
was to avoid further disintegration and alienation of the FSU countries while they were all 
becoming independent. The CIS did not act as a successor to the USSR. In some ways the CIS 
could be seen as a failure in that only some members benefit more than others and others hardly 
benefit at all from being a member, there is no common sense of community, and has been 
described as merely an ununiformed collection of countries.32   Despite these drawbacks and 
seemingly failures, the CIS has become a key institution in promoting independence. Relating 
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back the definition of interdependence of “mutual benefits” meaning not always adding 
something good, but preventing something unfavorable circumstances from happening.33  
Belarus is one of the countries which receives benefits from being a member of the CIS because 
Belarus benefits from trade with CIS member states, primarily Ukraine and Russia. “The 
development of bilateral cooperation with the CIS member states is one of the priorities of the 
foreign policy and foreign economic relations of the Republic of Belarus. These priorities are 
based on a number of historical, economic, political and cultural factors”, states the official 
foreign policy page of Belarus. The headquarters for CIS is in Minsk. Belarus is a member of many 
organizations that include CIS member states such as the Customs Union, EurAsEc, the Union 
State, and the Single Economic Space. Through these organizations Belarus enjoys a wide array 
of economic benefits, so despite its multi-vector approach to foreign policy, trade remains very 
high within this region. Belarus still remains very active within the CIS with trade. Since 1995, 
over half of the trade turnover in Belarus has been with CIS. Between Belarus and Russia, trade 
turnover has decreased about 12% between 2000 and 2005; however, imports remain high from 
Russia, whereas Belarusian exports to Russia are rapidly declining. Belarus is exceptional in this 
case among other CIS members.3435 
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3.2.2 Belarus and Russia 
Russia continues to be Belarus’ biggest partner in the world. Belarus trades extensively with Russia and 
relies on the Russian market for many exports of Belarusian goods. Belarus relies heavily on Russia for 
energy resources and Russia uses Belarus as a transit state to transport energy sources to European 
markets. Belarus has a special relationship with Russia as well in that the two countries are de jure a part 
of a Union State together, but de facto this Union State is not fully realized. Progression with the Union 
State with Russia has all but stagnated since the early 2000s. Military cooperation between Russia 
and Belarus remains high and arguably the only successful component of the Union State. There 
has not been success within the economic or political spheres and the Union is mostly for show 
and essentially a failure, similar to CIS. The favorable outcome of the military sphere happened 
in spite of the emphasis on the economy or political spheres. This is because of differences in the 
Russian and Belarusian relationship, where Russia has its own economic interests and a joint 
economic space between Russia and Belarus would be costly for Russia. The halt in progression 
of the Union State stems from “competing domestic and foreign policies” of Belarus and Russia.36  
Bilateral relations with Russia are stronger than the bilateral relations of Belarus with any other 
country. Belarus is not only connected to Russia economically, but also Belarus and Russia are 
vastly interconnected though military cooperation, free borders between the two countries, and 
they share the same language. Arguably the source of Belarusian economic success in the 1990s 
can be attributed to the preferential gas and oil prices granted to Belarus from Russia.  
Lukashenka counts on Russian subsides, either direct or indirect, and uses his transit location as 
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a bargaining chip. Belarus is crucially dependent on imports of energy from one source—Russia, 
and Belarus has a higher rate of energy usage than other former republics such as Ukraine. 
Belarus relies on Russia for industrial exports, is almost 100% dependent on Russia for gas, and 
is about 90% dependent on Russia for oil imports. Export is one example of Belarus ’relationship 
with Russia and the vast percentage of products that are exported to Russia. Export is a big 
component of the Belarusian economy. In 2005, exports in Belarus accounted for 54% of its GDP. 
Belarus is active within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in general, but is 
particularly active in its participation with Russia. Within the CIS, Russia receives 80.6% of the 
exports from Belarus. Not only does Belarus export the majority of its products to Russia, most 
of Belarus’ imports come from Russia accounting for 90.8% of its imports coming from Russia. 
After receiving many raw materials and semi-finished products from Russia, Belarus then exports 
finished value-added products to Russia. Belarus exports to Russia because Belarusian products 
are not as competitive in the West as they are in Russia so in this sense there is no reason for 
Belarus to reorient its trade relations and additionally no want by the West either.37 By means of 
the capital acquired through exporting to Russia, this allows the necessary capital for Belarusians 
to participate in Western markets. This is significant for Belarus has it allows for less dependence 
on Russia. Advantageous for Russia, Belarus also acts as a significant transit country for oil and 
gas from Russia transported to the European Union where 50% of oil products and 20% of gas 
exported from Russia to the European Union goes through Belarus. Belarus is a key producer of 
fuel for Europe and is a large producer of machinery and radio electronics. Belarusian industries 
                                                          




are all deeply integrated with Russia as Belarus depends on some raw materials and on 
parts/semi-finished products imported from Russia. Some industries are also highly attached to 
some major Russian consumers.  Belarus received many special benefits from Russia, especially 
regarding gas and oil. Belarus is still dependent on Russia for cheap oil and gas prices, which 
amount to savings contributing to 41% of the Belarusian budget; however, the prices are much 
higher now than they were in prior to 2006/2007. The change in the relationship between Belarus 
and Russia is apparent in the 2006/2007 oil crisis between the two countries. In 2006 there was 
an investment boom in Belarus, of which only 3% was foreign investment. This investment boom 
was conditional on the direct and indirect subsidies from Russia, ranging anywhere from $3 
billion up to $10 billion. At the end of 2006, Russia decided to cut back on subsidies, in part 
because Russia realized that Belarus was exchanging empty promises for financial aid. 38 
Lukashenko receives added benefits from its relationship with Russia. What does Russia receive 
from Belarus in return to make this an interdependent relationship? Belarus is a transit route for 
Russian oil and gas from Russia to European Union countries. Russia also uses Belarus as a 
location for military bases and Belarus acts as a buffer zone for Russia against Europe. Belarus 
exports the majority of its products to Russia so this provides Russia with quality goods. Another 
important aspect is that Belarus acts as an ally towards Russia, something that Russia wants and 
needs especially with NATO expansion and potential EU expansion. Russian dominance 
decreased after the collapse of the Soviet Union but Russia has still maintained some degree of 
dominance in the FSU and always counts on Belarusian support. Russia does not depend on 
                                                          




Belarus economically extensively but relies on Belarus to some extent for political support. An 
example of this motive for not wanting to create anymore tension with Belarus is that President 
Putin before the 2004 presidential election eased off on pressure on Belarus to pay back debts in 
order not to jeopardize his political base.39 Russia also relies on the land in Belarus for military 
bases and to transit gas and oil to European markets.   
Union State Past and Present 
Progression towards the Union State stalled almost immediately after former president of Russia 
Boris Yeltsin left office. From 1994 until 1999 Lukashenko and Yeltsin signed a series of treaties 
creating a Union State between the two states. The Union State is mostly just a title since many 
of the measures planned in the 1990s to join the two states together have all but failed or never 
became realized. For example, the Union State Treaty signed in 1999 stipulated that Russia and 
Belarus would have a joint monetary system by 2005. This never happened because this would 
mean that Belarus would adopt the Russian ruble, and Lukashenko did not want to do this out of 
fear that Belarus would become poorer, potentially not have enough representation in Moscow, 
and he feared that it would be the first step in weakening his power and threatening his 
presidency.40 Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed five treaties in the 1990s but so far Lukashenko and 
Putin have signed zero.  
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While Russia remained Belarus’ main trading partner, between 2004 and 2005 Belarus went from 
being Russia’s second highest trading partner to the sixth. To decrease the high dependence that 
Belarus has on Russia for oil and gas, Belarus is seeking alternate sources of energy and is 
considering building a nuclear power plant.41 Russia does not have to pay for the transit of gas 
and oil through Belarus which acts as a significant Belarus for Russia. Belarus does not do this for 
Russia without receiving something in return, i.e. Belarus benefits from the consumption of the 
cheap oil and gas. Additionally, Belarus resells the gas transported through eh country and this 
props up the national budget of Belarus. Belarus has political power too in that Russia would not 
want to risk another country joining NATO, and the West wants to have as many allies against 
Russia as possible. Belarus hosts Russian military bases on their soil.42 In addition to economic 
dependence, Belarus is militarily dependent on Russia as well. Belarus land has Russian airfields 
and missile bases as well as two facilities that are allowed to be present in Belarus until 2020—
one is a radar installation and the other a naval communication unit.43 
Throughout the 1990s, Russians favored Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus opposed to the 
opposition or any democratic leader because Lukashenko often favored Russian interests and 
even the most radical Russian politicians. The majority of Russians favor integration with Belarus, 
although many view integration as an annexation of Belarus. Russian politicians realize this and 
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even opposition groups like Yabloko support Russian-Belarusian integration, as long as Belarus 
would undergo democratic reforms.44   
Relations between Belarus and Russia shifted when Putin became president of Russia in 2000 
mostly because Putin is a different style of leader than Yeltsin was and Putin did not have certain 
obligations or standards to live up to like Yeltsin did, being the man who inherited Russia after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Putin’s style of leadership is much more pragmatic and 
consistent than Yeltsin’s was and this left less of a chance for Lukashenko to have sway with the 
Russian leader. Putin acts more in a way that both Belarus and Russia can achieve common goals 
independently instead of together in the Union State.45  
Lukashenko’s biggest fear regarding the Union State is losing his own power because the union 
could threaten Belarusian sovereignty and if so, would threaten his authoritarian rule. 
Lukashenko does not want Russian oligarchs to infiltrate Belarusian enterprises because this 
would undermine his power and threaten sovereignty. Russian oligarchs pose a bigger threat 
than even the opposition for Lukashenko because, at least for now, sovereignty equates his 
power.46  Russia has its own reasons for not wanting to integrate with Belarus. First of all, it would 
be very expensive. And second of all, it would be difficult to integrate Belarus with equal status 
without upsetting other federal subjects of Russia. The issue becomes then an issue of integration 
versus incorporation, and Lukashenko would not allow for incorporation unless he could become 
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the president of Russia himself, which became incredibly unlikely once Putin became president 
of Russia.47  
“Genuine unification” between Belarus and Russia is not likely because the two countries are 
very different in size and in their political structure. The two presidents—Lukashenko and Putin—
clash and their regimes do not integrate well, unlike in the European Union. The entire premise 
of the Union State has been described as “the exploitation of the natural attraction of two closely 
related peoples to each other”. Meaning that neither Belarus nor Russia sincerely want to have 
an equal partnership, and an equal partnership is not really possible considering even the most 
basic difference that Russia is a huge federation and Belarus is a small republic.48  
Lukashenko must realize that many Russians are under the impression that the Union State would 
act more like an annexation of Belarus than as an equal partnership because he has been 
reluctant to make any concrete measures to further along the Union State ever since Yeltsin left 
office. Throughout the 2000s even though nothing concrete occurred regarding the Union State, 
it was still apart of political rhetoric and important for the Belarusian and Russian leaders not to 
be in strong disagreement or engage in any conflict too forcefully. The main achievement of 
keeping the Union State in political rhetoric is keeping Belarus in Russia’s sphere of influence.49  
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3.2.3 Belarus and the West 
The European Union 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union some Soviet Bloc countries went on the path to become 
a part of the European Union and have so far all become a part of the EU, including the FSU Baltic 
countries, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Belarus did not follow this path and did not “return to 
Europe” despite the first wave of nationalism in the early years of the republic from 1991 to 1994. 
Western countries supported Belarusian independence but never put into place a path for 
Belarus to join the EU and Belarus did not want to either. Belarus was alienated from Russia in 
the early 1990s but then realigned with the Russian federation and remained close throughout 
the rest of the 1990s. The rest of the story of the relationship between the EU and Belarus is that 
the two had conflict from 1996 onwards due to differences in ideologies concerning the political 
and economic regimes present under Lukashenko’s presidency. The conflict between the EU and 
Belarus extends to other conflict of interests between Belarus and Western financial institutions. 
Additionally, the United States has been extremely vocal in recent decades against Lukashenko 
and regarding issues of democracy the EU and the United States often have similar agendas.50   
Belarus and the IMF 
Belarus became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1992. The IMF gives out loans on 
the basis that the country receiving loans will take necessary steps to transform the economy (if 
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necessary) in order to ensure that the loans will be paid back to the IMF. After receiving these 
loans, Belarus on two different occasions, once in 2001 and again in 2008, wrote letters of intent 
outlining the reforms the Belarusian government had agreed upon in compliance with the goals 
of the IMF and the necessary steps to transform the Belarusian economy and ensure that Belarus 
would pay back the loans. These letters of intent, were only that, intentions. After each letter to 
the IMF, Belarus did not change its economic structure or comply with the obligations set by the 
IMF and by themselves. Belarus declared that they would restructure their economy but never 
did. Belarus was willing to receive loans however not as willing to make any adjustments to their 
economy in order to comply with the IMF.  
Bealrus has received various loans from the IMF. The IMF states that Belarus received assistance 
twice in 1993 and once again in 1995. Belarus did not receive any more credit from the IMF until 
2009, following the economic crisis in 2008.51 Belarus is not allowed to use the money for the 
public sector but instead to support privatization.  
On April 13, 2001, Vladimir Yermoshin the Prime Minister of Belarus at the time and Piotr 
Prokopovich, Governor of the National Bank of Belarus, wrote their Letter of Intent for the IMF. 
In the first paragraph, they outline the main economic goals of Belarus, the main one of which to 
increase the macroeconomic stability of the Belarusian economy and in effect the standard of 
living of the Belarusian people by means of the joint economic space of Belarus and Russia. They 
wrote this Letter of Intent in order to demonstrate to the IMF that Belarus had every intention 
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to take concrete steps to meet the criteria set by the IMF in order to receive money from them.   
Attached with the Letter of Intent was a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies which 
outlined the specific steps that the Republic of Belarus would take in order to meet the standards 
set by the IMF. Prokopovich and Yermoshin stated that President Lukashenko supported the plan 
and that they would work interactively with the standards as opposed to blindly following the 
guidelines set by IMF. Some of the steps deemed necessary dealt with privatization and 
liberalization of the market.52 
The tone changed in the 2008 letter of intent and economic memorandum, in light of the world 
economy crashing in 2008. Belarus outlined that it expected a downturn in the Belarusian 
economy and had the main goal to minimize external factors affecting the economy. Belarus 
emphasized that the economy would be “socially-based” and increase the welfare of Belarusians, 
while developing a market-based economy.53 
According to the IMF in 2015, the Belarusian government still enacts great control over the 
economy and this makes the Belarusian government vulnerable to external influences.54 The IMF 
requires that Belarus commit to “deep structural reforms” and “consistent macroeconomic 
                                                          
52 Republic of Belarus.  “Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the government 
of the Republic of Belarus”. (April 13, 2001). https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/blr/01/index.htm. (Date 
accessed: Aug 11, 2016).   
53 Republic of Belarus. “Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding”. (December 31, 2008). 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2008/blr/123108.pdf. (Date accessed: Aug 11, 2016).    
54 Republic of Belarus. “2015 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for the Republic of Belarus”. (May 29, 2015). 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42960.0. (Date accessed: Aug 11, 2016).    
39 
 
policies”.55and What is at stake is over 2 billion USD that Belarus wants in order to boost its 
economy. The issue lies in that Belarus shows little signs of changing its entire structure of its 
economy since the measures Belarus promised to take never occurred. In the last few years there 
has been speculation that Belarus is moving away from Russia and is becoming more likely to 
work with the IMF, while also claiming that a decent amount of the lent money would then go to 
Russia from Belarus in order to pay off some debts.56 
Belarus and the World Bank 
According to the World Bank, Belarus has an upper-middle income economy. In the 1990s, the 
GDP of Belarus remained relatively stable until 2001 when the GDP grew exponentially until 2008, 
but rebounded almost immediately in 2009. The GDP growth in Belarus was higher than in 
Europe, Central Asia, and all other CIS countries.  According to the World Bank, Belarus has an 
upper-middle income economy.57 Despite all of the economic growth in Belarus and a 3-fold 
reduction in the poverty level, the World Bank maintains that the Belarusian economy remains 
macro-economically unstable. The World Bank states that the state-controlled economy does not 
allow for private small- or medium-sized businesses to grow, and that Belarus relies heavily on 
external debts. Belarusian debt to Russia increased and became very imbalanced in 2006 after 
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Russia increased oil and gas prices to Belarus, approaching market levels. 58 The World Bank gave 
Belarus over 1.3 billion USD and Belarus currently still owes over 660 million USD back to the 
IBRD.59 Belarus is still in line to receive 576 million USD.60 The money received from the IBRD goes 
to various projects that improve infrastructure and promote modernization projects.  The World 
Bank views Belarus as successfully interacting with them in the past and want to continue the 
relationship with Belarus. Since 2013, the World Bank has given its assistance to key areas of 
competitiveness and improved public infrastructure. To increase competitiveness, Belarus needs 
to reduce its state-controlled sector and increase activity in the private sector.61 However, the 
prospect of Belarus increasing its competitiveness and joining the global economy must not be 
very high since the World Bank does not expect results in this area.62 Belarus uses the money 
received from the World Bank to improve the infrastructure within the country and puts the 
money for purposes that improve the state. There does not appear to be a commitment to 
changing the state-controlled nature of the economy. There is little incentive for Belarus to do 
this when they continue to receive money from the World Bank without making any real 
measures to transform the economy into a competitive economy. This raises the questions of 
why the World Bank continues to give money to Belarus when Belarus does not make the changes 
necessary and how Lukashenko has gotten away with this for so long. Belarus could make the 
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desired reforms of the World Bank and in turn could potentially extract more benefits and 
perhaps receive more money.   
Western sanctions 
Diplomatic relations began between the West (the European Union and the United States) in 
1991. The relations deteriorated in 1997 after a referendum pushed by Lukashenko that the West 
deemed unfair and not free. Since then the United States and the EU now conduct relations with 
Belarus under “selective engagement” meaning that not all ties are severed with Belarus but 
some restrictions and sanctions have been put into place. The EU describes its relations with 
Belarus has “critical engagement” and put into place many sanctions in order to get President 
Lukashenko to either resign or drastically alter his regime. The sanctions have in general been 
against Lukashenko himself and other high-level officials, banning the officials from travel.63  
Lukashenko responded to these sanctions by then putting sanctions into place on certain 
countries and people and closed many embassies in Belarus in order to send the message that 
he will not comply with the demands of the EU and if they do not like his policies, he simply will 
not deal with them. Since 1997, the EU has extended its sanctions on Belarus every single year, 
until 2016 when they decided to ease up on the sanctions and remove some of the officials that 
were previously black-listed.64  
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The most recent development in the sanction-war between Belarus and the West is that the West 
has eased up on its sanctions on Belarus. One possible reason for this is because the EU and other 
western entities realize that Lukashenko is not going to leave the position of president anytime 
soon and does not want to reform his regime. The actions of the EU suggest they are willing to 
cooperate with Lukashenko to an extent as long as he appears to be moving, even slightly, away 
from Russia’s sphere of influence. Another possible reason is that the West realizes that trying to 
instill democracy in all the corners of the world does not always yield positive results and that 
there are far worse leaders or dictators than Lukashenko. The official reason why the EU decided 
to lift some sanctions off of Belarus is because in 2015 Lukashenko decided to release political 
prisoners whom the EU wanted to be released.65 This demonstrates that Lukashenko in recent 
years has decided for whatever reasons to be cooperative with the EU to some extent, isolating 
himself and Belarus less from the West.  
International Criticism of the Regime  
Since the referendums to the Belarusian constitution in 1996, President Lukashenko’s regime has 
received tremendous criticism from the international community claiming that Lukashenko 
established an authoritarian regime and is nothing short of a dictator.  
Democracy watchdog organization Freedom House describes Belarus as “not free” because of 
the issues of human rights and that opponents of the regime are not allowed to speak out against 
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the regime.66 Freedom House has claimed that Belarus is not free ever since 1998. The issues that 
Freedom House has with Belarus has a democratic free country are the same criteria that all 
western countries and organizations have with Belarus. 
The United States has been one of the harshest critics of Lukashenko’s political regimes and state-
dominated economies. Critique of Belarus increased after 2001 when President Bush became a 
proponent for spreading democracy around the world and viewed Belarus as an “axis of evil”.67 
This description of Belarus is a bit extreme but former President Bush claimed to have the 
interests of the Belarusian people at heart. In 2004, US congress signed the Belarus Democracy 
Act, which would ban certain exports to Belarus, fund the opposition, and reduce financial aid to 
the government.68 
All of the criticism of Lukashenko’s regime makes it less pleasant for Lukashenko to sustain his 
regime, and at the same time makes it more likely that Belarus will remain dependent on Russia. 
International organizations are willing to work with Belarus but maintain that Belarus must also 
meet them halfway and radically transform its regime. Arguably, Belarus is not cooperating very 
much with anyone. Belarus is notoriously a difficult state to work with and Lukashenko continues 
to attempt to isolate himself from the West. Belarus has power in the sense that it acts as a 
transit country for gas and oil and could use this to its advantage when dealing with Russia if it 
was not for the massive debt that Belarus has accumulated to Russia over the years.  
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3.3 Investment climate 
Belarus encourages investment in Belarus for a variety of reasons and strongly believes that other 
countries would benefit greatly by cooperating with Belarus. The highly state-owned industrial 
production is seen as a positive for foreign investment, where 70 percent of the industrial 
production is under the governmental sector. This is seen as a positive because then the 
privatized businesses that would like to exist in Belarus can be overseen by the state to ensure 
that only good business practice takes place. Another positive effect of investing in Belarus would 
be the highly qualified workforce apparently present in Belarus due to the high level of educated 
people in the country. Of course, Belarus boasts of its great location and the direct access to EEU 
countries, which would make convenient and help to maximize profits.69 
The benefits of investing in Belarus in some aspects are also the drawbacks. The high involvement 
and ownership of the state of industrial production enterprises leaves little room for privatization 
and for private businesses to act independently of the government and thus creates an 
atmosphere of less free-market governance of the business and much more state involvement. 
This would not be appealing to businesses that were used to operating in countries with less 
state-involvement also due the high level of paperwork required to make investment possible in 
the country. Over the years it has become easier to invest in Belarus but it still is not the most 
favorable place for foreigners to invest.70 One of the more appealing options would be the joint-
venture of the Great Stone Industrial Park, co-founded by China. This park allows for 10 years of 
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tax free profits and exists mainly to attract foreign investment and to inject some Chinese capital 
into the Belarusian economy.71  
3.4 Travel agreements and restrictions 
Foreigners from all but around 20 countries cannot enter Belarus without some type of visa. It is 
not uncommon for countries to have visa restrictions or to only have specific visa exceptions for 
certain countries who are either neighbors or have some special relationship with the country. 
In the case of Belarus, what is interesting in their visa exempt list of countries in that there is not 
one European Union country on this list and only 3 countries (Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) are 
exceptions if they hold a diplomatic passport. This highlights to some extent the reality that 
Belarus does not have very open and cooperative relations with the EU, despite the high level of 
trade that exists between Belarus and some EU countries. Visas are also quite expensive 
compared to other countries. The standard price for a short-term single entry visa is 60 euros, 
which is not terribly expensive but makes it more complicated for people who would want to 
travel to Belarus because not only would they have to go through a lot of paperwork in order to 
receive a visa, the price of the visa itself is relatively high.72   
3.5 Trade 
Since this is not economic research and I am not an economist, I will not and simply cannot give 
an analysis on trade data between Belarus and the rest of the world. I can however examine who 
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Belarus’ biggest trade partners are and have been by looking at trade data provided by 
international monetary organizations such as from the International Trade Centre (ITC), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO, in which Belarus has observer status, and from the UN 
Comtrade Database. The trade partners of Belarus have remained essentially stable since 2001. 
Russia remains Belarus’ main trading partner in both imports and exports. The EU is important 
for Belarus as well in both imports and exports. Belarus has some seemingly unlikely trading 
partners, China and Brazil. China and Belarus have some special projects underway and 
Lukashenko has been open to expanding his relationship with China. It is not entirely clear what 
motivates Lukashenko’s policies.7374   
In lieu of all the encouragement from these organizations and the benefits from trading with 
these partners that are also members with Belarus, in 2013, following Russia and Ukraine the 
next 7 biggest trading partners with Belarus were not members of the CIS. Six out of these 7 were 
members of the EU, who despite having a harsh stance against Belarus and the status of human 
rights and transparency within the country, still maintain good economic relations with Belarus. 
Within CIS, the main trading partners are Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, with Russia 
encompassing nearly 50% of the trade turnover of Belarus. Ukraine holds the second place of 
trade turnover at nearly 8%, and Kazakhstan only slightly over 1%. The perhaps surprising figure 
is that China holds 5th place for trade turnover in 2013. Trade turnover with Russia, Ukraine, and 
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the entire Customs Union decreased and trade with non-CIS members reached nearly 40% of the 
total trade turnover in Belarus.75 
4 Power and Belarus 
Belarus’ geographical location gives it a certain amount of power in dealing with other more 
powerful countries. Russian gas and oil travel through Belarus to reach European markets which 
gives Belarus some bargaining power with Russia and the opportunity to make money by re-
selling oil as solvents and lubricants and thus enhancing the Belarusian economy and providing 
more income to the national budget. Another source of power for Belarus is the special 
relationship that the state of Russia has with the state of Belarus. The Belarusian government 
overseas the transit of all the gas and oil going through Belarus but must deal with private Russian 
companies like Gazprom. The government of Russia has protected Belarus from unfavorable 
treatment from Gazprom, therefore giving Belarus power by having the Russian government as 
an ally against Russian private companies. Perhaps the biggest source of power in Belarus is 
President Lukashenko and his strong following in the country and effectiveness as a leader. He 
has held his own as a leader in light of immense international pressure to change his regime. As 
long as Lukashenko remains in power and does not reform his regime, the past has shown that 
he can withstand this pressure and demonstrates his power as a leader in deterring international 
criticism from affecting his power.  
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Belarusian power stems primarily from its role as a transit country for gas to Europe via the Yamal 
pipeline which begins in Siberia and ends in Poland, but must go directly through Belarus. The 
gas then moves to Germany from Poland via another German pipeline. Russia is looking into 
adding another branch to the pipeline which would bypass transit through Belarus and go 
through the North Sea directly from Russia to Germany. This would increase the ratio of power 
to dependence, thereby decreasing the power in Belarus against Russia and therefore would 
increase the power in Russia to increase energy prices in Belarus.  Naturally this new pipeline 
would come as concern to President Lukashenko. Already Belarus and Russia have had 
disagreements over the gas and oil supply to Belarus from Russia due to Russia wanting more 
money and Belarus both not wanting to pay more and also not being able to pay what they 
already owe.  
5 Belarus and dependence 
Looking back at the method of measuring dependence by James S. Shellenberg, that 
interdependence is rewards plus costs over the desire and ability to find an alternative partner, 
it is possible to determine the degree of dependence that Belarus has on others. So what are the 
costs and rewards that Belarus receives first by its cooperation with certain partners? And does 
Belarus have the desire or the ability to change who it cooperates with?76 
According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye interdependence is mutual benefits so 
relating back to this definition of interdependence Belarus and whoever it cooperates with must 
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have a mutually beneficial relationship. David Baldwin would further this definition by stating 
that benefits are not necessarily an added reward but are also the avoidance of a cost. This means 
that the interdependent relationships that Belarus has prevent costs as much or more than the 
rewards received.77 
Regarding economic cooperation with Russia, the rewards outweigh the costs and Belarus has 
some desire to find new economic partners, but the ability is not very great. This translates to 
Belarus being quite economically dependent on Russia. The Belarusian economy is highly 
connected to the Russian economy, despite the two countries having very different economic 
systems. Russia keeps Belarus dependent by offering incentives for Belarus to remain 
economically connected to Russia and thereby decreasing the desire for Belarus to find new 
economic partners. Belarus also does not really have the ability when Russia creates this cycle of 
dependence in Belarus where Russia has a product that is crucial to Belarusian national security 
and Belarus often does not have the ability to pay for its products, despite its drastically reduced 
prices. 
Belarus has to deal with the costs of dependence as well and not only rewards. The rewards are 
receiving money and the main cost is a reduction in power. As stated earlier, power is having 
something that others might want and using that to make the other do what you want. If you do 
not have something that the partner might need, or you do not have a product that is as crucial 
as the product received, then there is a decrease in the power to make one’s own choices and 
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act in a way that would be for self-interests. Belarus still has power but does not have as much 
power as Russia because Belarus is more dependent on Russia than Russia is on Belarus. 
Belarus Energy Dependency  
Belarus’ biggest dependence is its reliance on energy sources from Russia. Energy relations are 
important since they are connected to security and security influences foreign relations. The 
Yamal pipeline running through Belarus gives Belarus some bargaining power against Russia; 
however, Lukashenko’s isolation from the international community drastically diminishes his 
bargaining power.78 Belarus is dependent on Russia for oil and gas supplies. This dependence 
started after Belarusian independence in 1991 after no longer being a part of the Soviet Union 
where all the energy sources were under one giant conglomerate. The Soviet Union as a whole 
was energy-rich but independent Belarus was energy-poor. This lead to dependence on Russia 
because independent Russia was still energy-rich after gaining independence and Belarus 
essentially, due to its high energy needs, had no choice but to become reliant on Russia for gas 
and oil. This in turn impacted the relations that Belarus has with not only Russia, but also the 
West, and financial organizations like the IMF.79 Belarus is dependent on the energy supplies 
themselves and on the money made by re-transporting the gas to third countries. Belarus gained 
independence but still remained dependent on Russia and energy sources from Russia. Belarus 
is the most energy dependent country in the entire FSU and relies on Russia for 100% of its gas 
supplies and approximately 90% of oil. The Belarusian economy is contingent primarily upon gas 
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and not oil, and the vast majority of products exports from Belarus rely on gas and therefore low 
gas prices from Russia.80 Belarus does not have very much bargaining power as a transit country 
since only 20% of gas from Russia is transited through Belarus (opposed to 80 percent transited 
through Ukraine). Two pipelines run through Belarus and one of them is in fact owned by the 
Russian company Gazprom, where over 60 percent of gas is transited. Therefore, Belarus would 
not have the power to deny transiting gas for Russia because Belarusian company Beltransgas 
only transited 30 some percent of the gas.81 Nonetheless, this creates less dependence of Russian 
gas companies on Ukrainian pipelines and slightly less bargaining power to Ukraine since Russia 
can just use Belarus for transiting some of its energy sources. From 1994 until 2004, Belarusian 
and Russian energy relations were beneficial for both Russia and Belarus. Belarus received cheap 
prices and Russia did not have to pay taxes on transiting oil which in turn increased the profits of 
the Russian energy companies. An issue arose in 2004 between the Russian gas company 
Gazprom and the Belarusian company Beltransgas when Gazprom accused Beltransgas of 
stealing gas from their transit pipeline. In response Gazprom suspended its gas supply for what 
ended up being 24 hours. Margarita M. Balmaceda argues that this event is what changed the 
relationship between Belarus and Russia and marked the beginning of a new era of relations 
between the two countries. This lead an increase in the frequency of the threats of increasing 
energy prices for Belarus, something that would threaten Belarusian sovereignty.82 Belarus’ 
energy policy cannot be sustained if Russia stops giving Belarus special treatment. However, 
somehow in the short-term Lukashenko was able to influence the gas prices to keep them low 
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and without jeopardizing the relationship with Russia.83 How was Lukashenko able to do this in 
spite of his low bargaining power? Lukashenko has enough political power and support to be able 
to manipulate gas and oil prices in a way that remained suitable for Belarus. Belarus still remains 
dependent on Russia for gas and oil and Belarus has not done very much to decrease this 
dependence. The only attempt at diversification was purchasing some Venezuelan oil in 2010. 
But Belarus did not even consider diversification until 2004-2006, when energy prices increased 
and later relations with Russia became more tense.84 The dependence of Belarus on Russian 
energy and the dependence on the transit profits is not only a threat to Belarusian security, but 
also it is a risk to the security for Europe and the countries that also rely on Russian energy 
sources. Balmaceda attributes the risky nature of the energy relations between Russia and 
Belarus on domestic influences on energy policies.85 In 2007, Belarus and Russia had a conflict 
regarding paying taxes on the oil transited through Belarus. Russia at the time demanded that 
Belarus pay an export tax entirely to Russia instead of paying no export tax at all. Belarus 
responded to this by demanding that Russia then pay a transit tax in order to compensate for this 
tax. This led to a shut off in oil transit to and through Belarus for several days, disrupting the 
transit of oil to Poland and other EU countries as well.86 Since 2007 there have been a series of 
disputes and resolutions between Russia and Belarus regarding the energy resources. The most 
significant development was the purchase by Gazprom of all the Beltransgas shares of the Yamal 
pipeline. In 2010, Gazprom ownership of Beltransgas, the biggest gas transit company in Belarus, 
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surpassed 50 percent, giving the Russian gas company the majority of shares. Russia, in 2012, 
confronted Belarus for exporting oil products under the premise of being lubricants and solvents 
in an attempt to avoid paying export taxes to Russia.87 Although there are disputes about the oil 
supply to Belarus as well, the main proponent for distress would be the gas dependence in 
Belarus and the infiltration of Gazprom into Belarus. The Russian government is what made the 
gas tensions go away, since Gazprom is not a government owned enterprise, but works with the 
Belarusian state. Therefore, the Russian government in light of disputes would step in on the 
behalf of Belarus. This special bond and treatment of Belarus is not well understood, especially 
after the relationship of Belarus and Russia began to deteriorate after the gas disputes beginning 
in 2004, but coming to a head in 2007. Gazprom wanted to move to market prices for Belarus but 
was not allowed to do so by the Russian government, although raising prices to CIS and EU 
countries. Balmaceda and other scholars have described this as the game of “virtual integration” 
and the desire to keep up the façade that the Union State has not been forgotten. 88 
6 Conclusion  
Belarus’ uncooperative relationships with international organizations increase its dependence on 
Russia by decreasing the degree of power Belarus would be able to gain independent of Russia 
and therefore increasing the reliance on Russia for financial and political security.  
                                                          
87 Ibid., 283 
88 Balmaceda, Margarita Mercedes. The politics of energy dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between 
domestic oligarchs and Russian pressure. Vol. 40. University of Toronto Press, 2013. 207 
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The dependence on Russia also makes it difficult for Belarus to interact with other potential 
partners because Russia has significant power over Belarus and does not want to lose Belarus as 
an ally. This deters Belarus from forming any other serious alliances with other international 
actors.  
Lukashenko’s power benefits the most from the dependence of Belarus on Russia because 
popular support favors Lukashenko being president of Belarus, mostly stemming from the legacy 
of the Union State. This is still a popular idea in Russian politics and helps to secure Lukashenko’s 
power and gives Belarus more bargaining power when dealing with Russia. The Russian 
government prefers to keep Lukashenko as president since he has alienated himself from the 
West and therefore must rely on Russia and Russia uses Belarus as a transit country for oil and 
gas.  
Belarus is so dependent on Russia because of Lukashenko’s regime which alienates Belarus from 
the rest of the world. Belarus is heavily reliant on energy from Russia both for consumption and 
to support the national budget through reselling the oil and gas transited through the country. In 
the 1990s Lukashenko aligned himself heavily with Russia and the economy became directly 
reliant on Russia, where economic growth in Russia supported economic growth in Belarus. 
Nearly half of all Belarusian trade is with Russia so Belarus relies on the Russian market heavily 
for revenue.  
One incentive to lose this dependence on Russia would be to increase the power in Belarus to 
act independently and decrease the potential of Russia to impose its wants onto Belarus.  
Lukashenko has remained in power without any issue from Russia but aligning with the West 
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would threaten his power since the West is very clear that they do not approve of the political 
and economic regime of Lukashenko. Lukashenko has more incentive to remain connected to 
Russia in order to keep his power intact. If it is possible to break out of this dependence on Russia 
remains to be seen. With Lukashenko in power, this is unlikely.  
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